On November 4, 2008, Barack Obama marked the occasion of his election to the Presidency by delivering, curiously, perhaps the most sober speech of his political career. In it, he explicitly reached out to those Americans who hadn’t voted for him: “I need your help,” he said, “and I will be your president too.” Obama’s conciliatory tone may have been surprising given his decisive victory, but it shouldn’t have been unfamiliar. In fact, you may have heard it first from the mouth of one Senator John McCain. Not recently, sadly, but long ago, during the 2000 Republican primaries—before he sold his political soul.
That 2000 Republican Presidential Primary season has, in the years since, evolved into political legend—owing in part, doubtlessly, to essayist David Foster Wallace, whose “Up, Simba” followed John McCain in the wake of an early primary season surprise. McCain had defeated George W. Bush in the New Hampshire primary, and he did it by riding the wave of the then-highest youth voter turnout in US history — “nearly,” Wallace writes, “wip[ing] the smirk off Bush2’s face.”
McCain entered those primaries the underdog, the odds stacked in favour of Bush, pick of the GOP Establishment, against whom he’d had neither the money nor the pedigree to really compete. What McCain did have, though, was an appeal that went beyond ideology: a commitment to honour and service, dedication to raising the discourse of politics. He spoke out adamantly against special interests and condemned both parties. He promised in each speech that he would “[A]lways. Tell. The truth.”
John McCain appealed to the disenfranchised, to Democrats and Independents, and young voters; to those beat down by the system—“his sympathy,” commentator David Brooks says, “with the striving immigrant and his disgust with the colluding corporatist.”
He was, Wallace theorized, “an anticandidate.”
And he was ultimately crushed. The story, in truncated form: in the run-up to the next primary, Bush violates a handshake agreement and goes negative. He distorts McCain’s policy positions. “Anonymous” push polls suggest he has fathered an illegitimate black child. So McCain returns fire with his own negative ads, at which point Bush turns around and accuses McCain of being the one who’s violated their gentlemens’ agreement. And in responding, in being dragged down into a senseless back-and-forth, McCain—who, until New Hampshire had had nothing to lose, and so could tell the truth and maybe actually inspire something greater than indifference and apathy—becomes another product of the dysfunctional Washington he speaks out against.
This is all Bush needs. Disaffected voters stay home. The GOP faithful crown Bush2. You know how it ends.
This is the story that endeared McCain to moderate and liberal audiences. Of the man that wanted to run a campaign his daughter could be proud of. Who told voters in 2000 that he wouldn’t spend the surplus on tax cuts that “mostly benefit the wealthy.” Who even, in an extraordinary bit of political seppuku, labelled evangelists like Jerry Falwell, “agents of intolerance.”
John McCain became everyone’s favourite Republican.
So what happened in 2008? How did the most respectable figure of the American Right become so unrecognizable? And why, moreover, does the story of McCain’s abortive 2000 run sound so familiar?
Wallace, for his part, saw all this coming, even nine years ago. He envisioned McCain, in the days after the 2000 New Hampshire Primary, made aware quite suddenly that there was now something to win, or to lose—becoming “increasingly opaque and paradoxical… [I]ndistinguishable as an entity from the Shrub and the GOP Establishment against which he’d defined himself.”
In 2008, the GOP selected ‘John McCain the anticandidate’ as their nominee for president, even though John McCain had by then ceased to be the anticandidate. He had become—or was trying to represent himself as—the ideological equivalent of his competitors. Opaque. Indistinguishable. Asked in a 2007 debate, for example, whether he believed in evolution, McCain seemed dumbstruck by the silliness of the question and responded in the affirmative. When many of the other candidates reported they didn’t, the senator back-pedalled to exalt “the hand of God” in shaping the Grand Canyon . It was all part of an ‘if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em’ philosophy that undermined his very reputation.
But it worked—sort of. John McCain became the party’s nominee, but not because primary voters bought his shtick; it was because they remembered the myth of the ‘maverick’ Arizona senator. Indeed, exit polling indicated his victory in the 2008 New Hampshire primary came on the strength of those “dissatisfied” or “angry” with George W. Bush.
Still, I suspect it wasn’t even that primary voters really liked the rebel McCain—it was simply that, in the political climate of 2008, Republicans understood he was the only chance they had. John McCain would—paradoxically—restore the Republican brand that his ‘maverick’ reputation was implicitly campaigning against.
Campaign manager Rick Davis said in September that “the worst scenario for Obama is if he winds up running against the McCain of 2000.” Yet even in a campaign as poorly run as McCain’s was, someone must have realized that—after his sharp rightward list throughout the primaries—any such scenario was impossible. Simultaneously identifying and contrasting one’s self with a brand as badly tarnished as Republicanism requires a degree of cognitive dissonance which not even America’s values voters can navigate. Doing so while running a prototypically Rovian negative campaign borders on incomprehensibility.
What makes this doubly interesting is the answer to the other question raised earlier: if the story of McCain 2000 sounds familiar, it should. Because the whole scenario repeated itself in 2008, almost note-for-note with Obama. An upstart, like McCain before him, who recognized chronic Washington dysfunction, Senator Obama was candid, thoughtful, and honourable. A candidate that spoke eloquently of post-partisanship, who reached out to moderates and non-voters.
Obama denounced the influence of lobbyists, just as McCain had denounced soft money and bundled donations . He advocated reconciliation in a time of political divisiveness. He was the dark horse against Hillary Clinton—acknowledged establishment candidate and prohibitive favourite.
Never forget that in 2006 pundit Bill Kristol predicted Obama wouldn’t win a single primary.
Except he did win, in a way McCain couldn’t. Obama spent money wisely even as he out-raised his primary opponents; he built a grassroots organization that took in hundreds of millions of dollars, even with an average donation of just $86. He remained relentlessly positive in the face of Clinton’s negative turn, and his rallying cry—“Yes We Can”—was emblematic of the same American exceptionalism celebrated by John McCain in 2000.
In fact, Wallace’s essay reads today—party affiliation inverted—eerily like a primer on the Obama campaign, describing a politician who “actually seemed to talk to you like you were a person, an intelligent adult worthy of respect,” who wanted to excite and inspire people, “pulling more voters in, especially those who’d stopped voting because they’d gotten so disgusted and bored with all the negativity and bullshit of politics.” A candidate trying “to inspire young Americans to devote themselves to causes greater than their own self-interest.”
Obama limped to the finish against Clinton, maybe, but he demonstrated a viable path to nomination even for conciliators and outsiders and reformers. McCain might have followed a similar route. Instead, he tried to jump the queue.
If John McCain looks angry, it’s because he is angry, and in a sense he should be: he made the classic Faustian bargain, selling his soul for a shot at the Oval Office. He got that shot, but it came with the kind of cruel contractual fine-print for which the Devil is known—a showdown against himself, between John McCain-2008 and the Ghost of John McCain Past.
-with files from Barack Obama’s victory speech on Nov. 4, 2008; David Foster Wallace’s “Up, Simba” in Consider the Lobster :and other Essays; David Brooks’ “Ceding the Center” in The New York Times; Ann Banks’ “Dirty Tricks, South Carloina and John McCain” in The Nation; Richard A. Davis’ “The Anatomy of the Smear Campaign” in The Boston Globe; Richard A. Davis’ “The Making (and Remaking) of McCain” in The New York Times; Walter Shapiro’s “How John McCain Fought Against Himself” on Salon.com; Katharine Q. Seelye’s “A Scrappy Fighter, McCain Honed His Debating Style In and Out of Politics” in The New York Times; Jonathan D. Salant’s “Obama Leveraged Record Fundraising, Spending to Defeat Rivals” in Bloomberg; and msnbc news services’ “Obama Raises $150 Million in September” on msnbc.msn.com.
Graphic By Peter Trinh
